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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE SETTLEMENT OF
PROPERTY CLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES
By Julie Bomke Bannerman*
Introduction
The plaintiff in Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States1 accused the
United States of violating the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
taking property for public use without just compensation.2 Under the
Potsdam Agreement the United States authorized the Soviet Union to
take control of the plaintiff's East German plant, without providing for
reimbursement to the corporation for its loss. The Court of Claims de-
nied the Fifth Amendment allegation on the narrow ground that Ameri-
can property in enemy territoy falls subject to the war power and
therefore lies outside the scope of Fifth Amendment guarantees.3
Aris Gloves raises "a whole host of issues" about the Fifth Amend-
ment property rights of American nationals as they are affected by
arbitrary exercises of the foreign relations power.4 The problem arises
most frequently in the following contexts: (1) official State Department
refusal to espouse valid individual property claims against foreign gov-
ernments, usually leaving no other recourse to the claimant; (2) uni-
lateral waivers of such claims resulting from nonreviewable State De-
partment decisions; (3) government settlements with the taking states
which are significantly below the value of the property in dispute; (4)
failure by the government in some cases to distribute settlement pro-
ceeds to legitimate claimants; and (5) State Department refusal to
espouse the eligible claims of permanent resident aliens, on the ground
that they were not American "nationals" at the time of the alleged
foreign taking.
Crucial to the above situations, including the unique Aris Gloves
situation, is the fact that American property rights are compromised or
* Member, third year class.
1. 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
2. Id. at 1387.
3. Id. at 1391.
4. Round Table: Toward More Adequate Diplomatic Protection of Private
Claims, 65 AM. SoC. INT'L L. Ioc. 333, 334 (1971). See also Note, The Nature and
Extent of Executive Power to Espouse the International Claims of United States
Nationals, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAf'L L. 95, 118-21 (1973).
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extinguished by the deliberate action of the United States, principally
of the State Department. Although facilitating good foreign relations
may be sufficient "public use" for the sacrificed property interests,
no duty has yet been assumed by the government to compensate the
claimants for their losses.
This note discusses the constitutionality of the government's uni-
lateral role in international property claims in light of the Fifth Amend-
ment property provision and due process clause and in light of the
foreign relations power of the executive branch. In addition, it analyzes
the informal State Department procedures for the espousal of claims and
the quasi-judicial procedures of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commis-
sion in adjudicating claims to lump sum settlements. The narrow role of
federal courts in the domestic adjudication of international claims, and
the limits imposed on that role by the act of state and sovereign
immunity doctrines, are also examined.
The three branches of federal government must review the theory
and practice of their roles in international property claims settlements in
order to accord American nationals adequate protection of their proper-
ty interests abroad, including, where necessary, compensation for depri-
vations of those interests when those deprivations are directly attribut-
able to State Department, or other governmental action.
I. Governmental Theory
Individual property claims against foreign states are handled al-
most entirely by the State Department. If the department compromises
American property interests through its claims policy, officials find legal
support for the department actions in principles of constitutional law
and international law.
The department argues on constitutional grounds that all facets of
diplomatic protection, including foreign claims espousal and settlement,
fall within the foreign relations power reserved to the executive branch.5
Therefore, once the department is involved in a claims matter, it as-
sumes complete jurisdiction over the claim with little or no interference
from the other branches of government." Based on its alleged preroga-
tives in the area of foreign affairs, the State Department rejects the
contention that it owes any duties to the aggrieved national to espouse
5. See A. RoviNE, DIGEST OF UNrrED STATES PRAIcE W INTERNATIONAL LAW
333 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RoviNE]. See also 8 M. WmTEMAN, DIG=s OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1216 (1967) [hereinafter cited as WHITEmAN].
6. See RovINE, supra note 5, at 332-33. See also 8 WrrEMAN, supra note 5, at
1216-18. A widely quoted Supreme Court decision generally supporting broad foreign
affairs discretion is Justice Sutherland's opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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the claim, settle at full value, or abstain from waiving the claim.7 Fabian
A. Kwiatek, the department's Assistant Legal Advisor for International
Claims, argues that diplomatic protection is not a legal right:
Such protection, instead, is in effect an extra-ordinary legal remedy
which is employed by the Department in its discretion in the con-
duct of diplomatic relations. The Department is the sole judge of
what claims it will enforce, and of the manner, time, means and
extent of enforcement . .. No constitutional rights are involved.
Furthermore, the Department may, as a matter of pure right, refuse
to present legally valid claims and may settle, surrender or compro-
mise claims without consulting the claimant.8
Mr. Kwiatek also asserts that the department may espouse a claim
"without being requested to do so either formally or informally by the
aggrieved national,"9 and moreover, that such action can be taken
notwithstanding "vigorous protest by such national." 10
From the perspective of international law, the department adopts
the traditional theory that nations alone, not individuals, are the subjects
of international law." Under this theory, the individual's claim is not
his, but his nation's, once it is espoused in the international arena." -
Because of this theoretical "merging" process, the state maintains its
prerogative to handle foreign property claims in its discretion.
Both the constitutional law and the international law underpinnings
of governmental theory in the area of foreign claims settlements recently
have been under attack. For example, the War Powers Resolution, 3 the
legislation requiring that executive agreements be transmitted to Con-
gress"4 and widespread academic skepticism concerning the constitu-
tional basis for executive monopoly in foreign affairs' 5 all raise serious
questions about the broad power over foreign relations asserted by the
executive branch.
Likewise, the theory in international law that only states, and not
individuals, are subjects of international law has been challenged by
7. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES §
212-13 (1965); ROvINE, supra note 5, at 332-33; 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 1216-18.
8. RovNE, supra note 5, at 333 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 332.
10. Id.
11. See 1 L. OPPENmEiM, INTERNAiONAL LAw 19-20 (8th ed. 1955); 1 WH-rEMAN,
supra note 5, at 35-37.
12. E. BORCHARD, THE DPLOMATC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 356-57
(1927); The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, (1924) P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 2, at
6.
13. 50 U.S.C §§ 1541-48 (Supp. 1973).
14. 1 U.S.C. § 112b (Supp. 1973).
15. E.g., Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L.
Rv. 1 (1972).
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many observers. Lauterpacht called this doctine "obsolete""' and "unable
to stand the test of actual practice."' 7 Philip Jessup said that "the right
to fair treatment is a right of the individual and not merely the right
of a state with which he is connected."' 8 The "merging theory" also has
been weakened by the impressive worldwide human rights movement,' 9
evidenced most strikingly by the direct acceptance of individual petitions
for grievances by the Human Rights Commission of the United Na-
tions.2 0
Because the cornerstone of the traditional theory that individuals
will not be recognized internationally has been eroded by the evolution
of some international legal status for the individual, the associated
theory, that a person's claim against a foreign state is not an individual,
but a national, claim also has been eroded. In essence, if the individual is
recognized internationally, his claim does not have to be presented to the
foreign state as that of the nation alone.
In sum, the theories behind the State Department's role in foreign
claims settlements are open to serious questioning. Arguably the foreign
relations power is not so broad that it submerges individual rights in the
exercise of discretionary authority over claims settlements in which the
government assumes a role. Further, it is arguable that, because individ-
uals seem to have some status in international law, their claims are not
16. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 LAw Q. REv. 438, 439
n.2, 440 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht].
17. Id. at 441.
18. Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46 COLUM. L. R V.
903, 909 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Jessup].
19. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONvENION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; COLLECTED TEXTs (6th
ed. 1969); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, 660 U.N.T.S. (1966); International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 220 A, 21 GAOR SUpp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810 at 71 (1948).
As Lauterpacht points out, other examples of the invalidity of the "object" theory
include the imposition of responsibility for war crimes on individuals; universal jurisdic-
tion over pirates and, more recently, the view that hijackers are isolated "subjects" of
international law; and the occasional application of international law to individuals in
municipal courts. Lauterpacht, supra note 16. See generally LEECH, OLIvER & SWEENLY,
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 572-724 (1973). See also F.V. GARcA-AMAnOR, L.
SOHN & R. BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATIONS OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INJURIES TO ALIENS (1974) [hereinafter cited as GARCiA-AMADOR, SOHN & BAxTER];
W.P. GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIvmUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS (1966) [hereinafter cited as GORMLEY]; 1 WmTEMAN, supra note 5, at 50-
58.
20. ECOSOC Res. 1503 (XLVIII), 48 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. A, at 8 (1970).
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by legal necessity merged into the government's claims and thereby lost
to the individual on the international level.
11. Governmental Practice
A. Present Context
In 1973 the private direct investment of American citizens abroad
was 107.3 billion dollars, compared with 78.2 billion dollars in 1969
and 31.9 billion dollars in 1960.21 Accompanying this increase in
American foreign investment has been a marked rise in the number of
individual and mass nationalizations and expropriations within lesser
developed countries. Both the investment and expropriation phenomena
have contributed to a high number of group and individual property
claims by American nationals against foreign governments. 21
Two recent developments have complicated the foreign investment
picture. First, a split has emerged between western and third world
nations on the issue of compensation for expropriations and other
takings. Second, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
a government-sponsored insurance corporation, is being phased out to
private industry; OPIC has served as a strong guarantor and as a non-
political medium for the settlement of investment disputes. Both devel-
opments may bring added pressure to the State Department for effective
intervention on the investor's behalf.
Western nations sanction expropriations which are (1) nondiscri-
minatory, (2) for public purposes, and (3) followed by "adequate,
prompt and effective" compensation to the owners. The requirement of
compensation for the taking has been rejected by several third world
nations. The result has been a split in views on the traditional theory and
an added source of uncertainty for American investors.2" As Justice
Harlan wrote in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:
The disagreement as to relevant international law standards re-
flects an even more basic divergence between the national interests
21. Economic Report of the President Transmitted to Congress Feb., 1975, at 357.
22. See R. LILiCH & G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION 2-3 (1962) [hereinafter cited as LILLICH & CmsTEN-
SON].
23. See THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (R.
Lillich ed. & contrib. 1972) and 2 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw (R. Lillich ed. & contrib. 1973). See also G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doe. A/5217 (1962) (allowing compensation in accord-
ance with local and international law) as compared with G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 30, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/9030 (1973) (omitting the reference to international law).
See also 8 M. WHITEmAN, supra note 5, at 1143-83.
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of capital importing and capital exporting nations and between the
social ideologies of those countries that favor state control of a con-
siderable portion of the means of production and 'those that adhere
to a free enterprise system. 24
To combat the uncertainties of overseas investment, including the
risk of unreimbursed expropriations, many American businesses have
been insured through OPIC, which provides insurance guarantees
against certain major risks, including expropriation.25 "During the 25
year history of this program, investors have paid $39 million for this
coverage and $1,722,000 in claims have been paid. 28
The government stake in this investment insurance program is
being "phased out" to the private insurance industry, pursuant to legisla-
tion passed in 1974.27 The effect of this phase out on the settlement of
investment disputes may be significant. According to the Congressional
Research Service Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
which considered the legislation recently passed:
... OPIC's greatest asset is its ability to assist the developing coun-
try and the multinational corporation in the final settlement of in-
vestment disputes by translating the investment dispute into a new
mutually acceptable business arrangement. A public corporation
can maintain a low profile, while State Department management
of the problem elevates it to the diplomatic level.28
The Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs agreed that OPIC- helped "to depoliticize
the investment dispute through insulating the U.S. Government by
keeping the investor out in front."29
The effect of the phase out, therefore, may be to remove what has
been an effective and non-political medium for settling investment
disputes. In an age of eroding international standards on what consti-
tutes a valid expropriation policy, the OPIC buffer has assumed an even
more important role than it might have acquired absent such ideological
conflicts. It is uncertain whether private industry can approach the scope
of the coverage provided by the United States. More importantly, it is
24. 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964).
25. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200(a) (1970).
26. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. REPORT
ON THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION AMENDMENTS Acr (Comm. Print
1974).
27. Act of Aug. 27, 1974, PuB. L. No. 93-390, 88 Stat. 763, amending 22 U.S.C.
§§ 2191-2200a (1975). See Wall Street Ioilrnal, Feb. 20, 1975, at 19, col. 1.
28. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE OVERSEAS
PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATIONS AMENDMENTS AcT, S. REP. No. 93-676, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 60 (1974).
29. Id.
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doubtful that private industry will have the settlement clout of the
United States OPIC negotiators.
Two problems emerge. Americans with expropriated property
overseas may encounter refusals by some expropriating nations to pro-
vide compensation for their takings. Moreover, the strong United States
overseas investment guarantee program may be weakened in scope and
settlement effectiveness with its transfer to private industry. The com-
bined effect may be increased pressure for diplomatic intervention to
remedy private wrongs."0 It is likely that the claimant will be compelled
to seek State Department intervention, if redress through the local forum
fails.
B. State Department Procedures
There is no formalized procedure in the State Department for
processing international claims. 31 The department does not operate
under the Administrative Procedure Act.32 Therefore, it is essential
that the claimant prepare and document his claim as persuasively as
possible.3"
Once the claim is drafted and submitted, the department decides
"whether there is a valid ground for a claim," and, if there is, determines
"the manner in which the claim is prepared and documented, the
international legal grounds upon which the claim is asserted, the amount
which is demanded and accepted in settlement and finally what shall be
done with any amount received. ' 4 The department makes it clear that:
While it frequently happens that during the course of a diplomatic
claim the Department consults the claimant in various stages thereof
30. According to LmLicz & CHRISTENSON, "the number of international claims
seems destined to increase. Foreign trade and investment is at an all time high....
Social and economic changes in some countries and chronic instability in others are
bound to impair this investment and generate many claims. Trade and travel also pro-
vide situations where property and personal rights of American nationals may be in-
fringed." Supra note 22, at 2-3.
31. See LILICH & CHRISTENSON, supra note 22, at 88-103.
32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970). Referring to grants of sovereign immunity, to
which the State Department applies the same discretionary control, then Acting Legal
Advisor George Aldrich stated: "Mhe Department of State is exercising a discretion-
ary, foreign affairs function to which the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act do not apply. We do. provide an opportunity for the parties directly concerned to
express their views to the Department in writing and orally if they so desire, but we do
not regard this as an adjudicatory procedure." RovINE, supra note 5, at 224.
33. To provide guidelines for prospective claimants, the State Department publishes
"Department of State Suggestions for Preparing Claims," which is available through the
department.
34. 8 WHrrEMAN, supra note 5, at 1217, quoting from a letter written on April. 13,
1961 by the then Assistant Legal Advisor for International Claims Spangler.
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and usually endeavors to obtain a settlement satisfactory to the
claimant, there is no legal obligation to do so.35
In order to qualify for State Department espousal, a property claim
must meet three tests: (1) an invalid taking attributable to the foreign
government,16 or a valid taking for public purposes with inadequate
compensation,37 (2) American nationality on the part of the property
owner from the time of taking through espousal and settlement,"8 and
(3) prior exhaustion of foreign local remedies.3 9
A taking is invalid if it is either discriminatory against foreigners or
for private purposes. 40 An expropriation meeting the tests of public
purpose, nondiscrimination and compensation is recognized by the Unit-
ed States as legal.4 1 The requirement of continuous American nationali-
ty precludes citizens who were naturalized following the taking and
permanent resident aliens from seeking redress through the American
government for their claims against foreign powers. The State Depart-
ment evidences no sign of reconsidering its policy of discrimination
against non-citizens. 42 The requirement that foreign remedies be ex-
hausted usually is interpreted according to common sense.43 Where
exhaustion is obviously futile, the applicant will be excused from meet-
ing the requirement. "The trend today seems to be away from the strict
enforcement of the traditional local remedies rule. 44
The State Department receives approximately 120 letters per
35. 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 1216 (memorandum from the Office of the
Assistant Legal Advisor for International Claims, Fabian A. Kwiatek).
36. 8 WmTEMAN, supra note 5, at 969-1136. See also, GARcIA-AMADoR, SOHN &
BAXTER, supra note 19, at 129-31, 200-34, 363-67; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 185 (1965).
37. 8 WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at 1020-1183; RESTATEMmNT (SEcoND), FOREGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIrED STATES §§ 185-90 (1965). In response to the takeover of
the American owned Nelson Bunker Hunt Oil Company by Libya in 1973, the American
Embassy in Tripoli delivered a note to the Libyan government, which read in part:
"Under established principles of international law, measures taken against the rights and
property of foreign nationals which are arbitrary, discriminatory, or based on considera-
tions of political reprisal.. . are invalid and not entitled to recognition by other states."
RovnE, supra note 5, at 335.
38. 8 WHIEMAN, supra note 5, at 1233-68.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
206-10 (1965); Interhandl Case, (1959) I.C.J. 6.
40. See. note 37 supra.
41. See note 37 supra.
42. According to Fabian A. Kwiatek, Assistant Legal Advisor for International
Claims in the State Department, claimants must be "bona fide citizens, by birth or by
naturalization" at the time of the alleged taking. Interview (telephone) with Fabian A.
Kwiatek, Feb. 27, 1975.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
206-10 (1965).
44. LILLICH & CHRISTENSON, supra note 22, at 98.
HASTINGS CONSITUXTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY1098 [Vol. 2
CLAIMS SETLEMENTS
month from individual claimants seeking some official redress for their
grievances. Of these, five or six per month are accepted for espousal.
Many of the others fail because one of the requirements is not met.45
C. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC)
In cases involving a large number of claims the United States
traditionally has utilized claims commissions to distribute funds from
lump sum agreements negotiated between the United States and the
offending nation.48
The most recent commission is the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, which was established by Congress in 1954.47 The FCSC
is a domestic agency, charged with adjudicating claims to lump sum
funds and then certifying those claims deemed valid to the secretary of
the treasury for payment.4 8
In contrast to the State Department, the procedures established
for the FCSC for processing claims are quasi-judicial in nature. Each
claim is filed, with supporting documents, and docketed for hearing.49
Staff attorneys examine the claims to determine if the requisite allega-
tions have been made: (1) American ownership at the time of taking,
or within a period prescribed by the relevant settlement statute, (2)
continuous American ownership thereafter, (3) the property value, and
(4) dates and circumstances of the loss asserted.50 The claim is then
presented to the commission, which is comprised of three members
appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.51
Upon full review of the claim, the commission issues a "Proposed
Decision," which may be objected to by the claimant in subsequent oral
or written hearings. The commission then renders a final decision, which
again may be objected to through the filing of a petition to reopen the
claim based on newly acquired evidence.52
If a new hearing is denied the commission enters its final decision
with a full statement of the facts and reasoning supporting the deci-
45. Interview (telephone) with Fabian A. Kwiatek, Jan. 22, 1975.
46. In the past 160 years, "[s]uch commissions have distributed funds under
treaties, conventions or agreements with Spain in 1819, Great Britain in 1826, Denmark
in 1830, France in 1831, the Two Sicilies in 1832, Spain in 1834, Peru in 1841, Mexico
in 1848, Brazil in 1849, China in 1858, Great Britain in 1871, Spain in 1898, China in
1901, Turkey in 1934, and Mexico in 1934 and 1941. R. LILUcH, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THER ADJUDICATION nY NATIONAL CoMMISSIONs 8-9 (1962) (citations omit-
ted) [hereinafter cited as LILLICH].
47. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-43 (1970).
48. 22 U.S.C. § 1624 (1970).
49. FCSC DEc. & AN.4 (1968).
50. Id.
51. 1972 FCSC ANN. REP. 3.
52. FCSC Dnc. & ANN. 6-7 (1968).
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sion. 58 By statute, the decisions so entered are final and conclusive on all
questions of law and fact, and are not subject to review by any other
"official, department, agency, or establishment of the United States or
by any court by mandamus or otherwise.""
The FCSC adjudicated claims against Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, Rumania, Italy, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, for which
funds were available through agreements negotiated between the United
States and those countries. 55 In addition, the commission handled claims
against Germany and Japan which were funded by the liquidation of
German and Japanese assets in the United States under the Trading with
the Enemy Act.56 The commission also was charged with adjudicating
claims filed by former POW's and civilian American citizens arising
from the Vietnam conflict and the U.S.S. Pueblo incident.5 7 Claims
against Cuba and the People's Republic of China have also been adjudi-
cated by the commission, although no claims settlement agreements
have been concluded with these countries.58 Other programs assigned to
the FCSC include the Philippines Claims Program,59 the Lake Ontario
Claims Program, 9 and finally, the Micronesian Claims Program,6
which provides for a separate commission under the direction of the
chairman of the FCSC.
In general, the FCSC plays an important role in claims settlement
and distribution. Its existence reduces the need to establish separate
distribution mechanisms for each settlement concluded. Moreover, the
investigatory role prior to settlement, as in the Cuban and Chinese cases,
can aid negotiators in arriving at settlements which better reflect the
total sums claimed. However, the FCSC was created to accommodate
the lump sum method of settlement. Lump sum settlements invariably
relegate claimants to small distributive shares which bear little relation
to their actual claims. Moreover, the blanket no-review statute unfairly
53. Id. at 7.
54. 22 U.S.C. § 1623(h) (1970) (emphasis added).
55. See 22 U.S.C. H9 1621-43 (1970).
56. 50 U.S.C. App. H9 1-44 (1970).
57. 50 U.S.C. App. H9 2001-2017 (1970).
58. It should be noted that, because of the lack of a mechanism for presettlement
investigations as to the possible number of claims, the sums available to claimants have
had no material relationship to the dollar amount of claims finally pressed, thereby
requiring claimants to receive pro rata shares below the value of their claim. This
preadjudication of claims against China and Cuba with the resulting reports to Congress
and negotiators is an important step in promoting private interests, as the settlements
ultimately concluded may better reflect the funds needed to compensate adequately the
claimants.
59. Act of Aug. 30, 1962, Pun. L No. 87-616, 76 Stat. 411.
60. Act of Aug. 15, 1962, PuB. L. No. 87-587, 76 Stat. 387.
61. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2018-20 (Supp. 1973).
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restricts claimants who do not receive adequate protection of their claims
by the settlement commission. Both problems present questions which
are addressed below.
i. The Role of the Courts: The Act
of State Doctrine and Sovereign Immunity
It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss fully the act of state
and sovereign immunity doctrines and their effects on foreign claims
litigation in United States courts. Both doctrines are undergoing changes
in interpretation and application, and their current status is ambiguous
Therefore they are analyzed in general terms only, with emphasis on the
effects the two doctrines have on the limited role of federal courts in the
settlement of foreign claims.
A. Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine asserts that "the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory.' 62 Read literally, the act of state doctrine would
preclude federal courts from reviewing any foreign acts of expropriation.
Moreover, in federal court, a claimant to expropriated property must
prove as an element of his cause of action that the expropriation was
wrongful under international law. Because of this requirement, the act
of state doctrine could be an absolute bar to the claimant in court by
preventing him from raising the essential issue of whether or not the
expropriation was wrongful.
Notwithstanding the literal reading of the doctrine, the so-called
Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine allows federal courts
to review the legality of expropriations if the State Department notifies
the courts that such review will not threaten foreign relations. 63 Also,
the Hickenlooper Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
state that, under certain narrow facts, courts shall review the legality
of acts of expropriation unless the State Department specifically instructs
them not to proceed.64
62. Underhill v. Hernandez 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (emphasis added).
63. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvart-Maatschappij,
210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
64. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970). The amendments state in part: "[N]o court
in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to
make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in
a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party...
based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking ... by an act of that
state in violation of the principles of international law .... [This does not apply] in
any case with respect to which the President determines that application of the act of
state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
Fall 19751 CLAIMS SE'TMEMENTS
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Expropriation cases reach federal court if there is personal jurisdic-
tion over the corporation or persons responsible for the taking. It is
more common for the court to obtain jurisdiction by the quasi-in-rem
attachment of property which can be traced to the original expropriation
and which is in transit through the United States. For example, in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the American claimant purchased sever-
al loads of sugar in Cuba. The sugar was nationalized, and while in
transit through New York, was attached by the claimant. The claimant
thereby established domestic jurisdiction over the claims matter.6"
The I-Ickenlooper Amendments specifically cover cases "in which
a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party...
based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking .. .by
an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law. '66
In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that the amendments refer to direct
title actions and not to cases where the expropriation issue is asserted by
way of counterclaim or setoff. Nevertheless, the Court decided that
counterclaims raising the joint issues of title and of the legality of the
foreign expropriation are proper subject matter for federal courts.""
Three justices based the decision on the classic Bernstein exception
rationale, referring to a notice sent to the lower court by the State
Department, which permitted that court to decide the counterclaim on
its merits. The other justices indicated reservations on the question of
whether courts are bound by State Department notices in cases not
covered by the Iickenlooper Amendments." In future cases, the Su-
preme Court may be called upon to clarify its position on the continued
viability of the Bernstein exception.
Despite the evident ambiguities surrounding the act of state doc-
trine, it is clear that the State Department still exerts significant power
over claims litigation in federal courts. If the State Department deter-
mines that court review of foreign acts of expropriation will harm
foreign relations, it is unlikely courts will ignore that determination until
the Bernstein exception is conclusively overruled. As has been stated, in
cases covered by the Hickenlopoer Amendments, courts must honor a
State Department decision barring review.
The repercussions of such State Department control are obvious: a
claimant may be denied a hearing on the merits of his case if the
department opposes court review. Therefore, it is possible to contend
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the
court."
65. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) (1970).
67. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
68. Id. See the concurring opinions of Powell and Douglas and the dissenting
opinions of Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun.
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that a claimant barred by the State Department from redress in court is
deprived of his property without due process of law. A Fifth Amend-
ment allegation might be based on a valid claim to property taken in
violation of international law and proof of no other possible redress than
that provided in federal court. To date, there is no case on point.
B. Sovereign Immunity
The due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment are likewise
threatened when the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applied to pre-
clude bringing a sovereign or his agent into court. For example, in
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.,6 9 five libels were filed against a Cuban
merchant vessel which came to the United States when its crew sought
political asylum. Cuba had expressly waived sovereign immunity in re-
lation to one of the claimants, United Fruit Company, who alleged with
convincing documentation that part of the vessel's cargo was confiscated
corporation property. Ignoring the waiver the court allowed immunity
upon receipt of a note from the State Department instructing that im-
munity be granted. The claimants were thereby deprived of the oppor-
tunity to assert or prove their property rights.
At this time, there is pending legislation, approved by the State
Department, which promises to alleviate the injustice apparent in Rich.
The legislation denies sovereign immunity where the basis of the sover-
eign's action is commercial activity, expropriation, or other private or
"wrongful" acts. Sovereign immunity is also denied where the sovereign
party waives it, as by suing or asserting a counterclaim in federal court.
The legislation also provides a procedure for obtaining personal jurisdic-
tion over foreign states, thereby removing the need for quasi-in-rem
attachments.7 °
The keystone of the new legislation is that it transfers from the
State Department to the courts the task of determining whether a state is
entitled to immunity. As Charles Brower, Acting Legal Advisor of the
Department of State observed:
Transfer of the decision-making process to the courts will ensure
that sovereign immunity questions are decided on legal grounds
under procedures guaranteeing due process. This in turn should
better ensure the consistency of decisions and reduce their for-
eign policy consequences.Vl
Until the proposed bill is passed, and in future cases to which the
law does not apply, courts must actively question unjust executive
interventions founded on the sovereign immunity doctrine. In the same
69. 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
70. 119 CoNG. Rnc. 2213-20 (1973).
71. RovIw, supra note 5, at 220-21 (emphasis added).
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sense, courts must continue to challenge improvident applications of the
act of state doctrine. A claimant who meets jurisdictional requirements
should have a right to prove his case free from unilateral State Depart-
ment interventions which he cannot effectively challenge.
IV. The Problems Raised by Theory and Practice
A. Issues
Within the broad context presented above several issues emerge.
The central issues are: (1) If the State Department refuses to espouse a
valid property claim against a foreign state, and the claimant has
exhausted all other available remedies, must the government compensate
him on the ground that this was a Fifth Amendment taking? (2) If the
government unilaterally releases a foreign property claim by agreement
with the taking state, must it then compensate the claimant for the waiver
of his property interest? (3) If the government accepts a property settle-
ment from the foreign state significantly below the value of the confis-
cated properties, does a Fifth Amendment duty arise to compensate
claimants for the unreimbursed portions of their claims? (4) If the
government receives a property settlement from the taking state, is it
then under a duty to disperse the funds to legitimate claimants? (5) Is
the State Department policy of refusing to espouse the claims of per-
manent resident aliens violative of equal protection guarantees? (6) Is
adequate due process afforded claimants by State Department procedures
for processing espousal requests? (7) And finally, is the statute barring
judicial review of FCSC decisions unconstitutional on due process
grounds?
These seven questions will be discusssed in sequence.
B. Refusal to Espouse and the Fifth Amendment
There is no legal duty to espouse the claim of an individual injured
by a foreign state. Borchard states that the individual injured has "no
legally enforceable right" to the protection of his own state.7 2 When the
failure to espouse a claim results in a deprivation of property for the
public purpose of promoting good foreign relations, should a duty arise
under the Fifth Amendment to compensate the injured claimant?
The corporation in Aris Gloves v. United States"3 asserted that "the
failure of the United States to press for compensation for the loss of
property belonging to American citizens, in essence, amounted to a
licensing of the Russian government to dismantle and carry away plain-
72. E. BORcHm, THm DIPLOMAnC POTECION OF CnZENS ABROAD 18 (1929).
73. 420 F.2d 1386 (CL C1. 1970).
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tiff's property without having to pay compensation. '74 Therefore, the
plaintiff claimed, "the United States should be obliged to compensate it
for its losses since defendant failed to protect its property interests, and
since defendant even went to the point of actually authorizing a third
party to take control of plaintiff's property without first requiring just
compensation.17 5
The Court of Claims conceded:
[i]t was not necessary for the defendant -to have actually taken
physical possession of plaintiff's property in order for there to have
been a fifth amendment taking. A taking can occur simply when
the Government by its action deprives the owner of all or most
of his interest in his property.7 6
However, the court continued, "whether there is a fifth amendment
taking cannot turn simply on general principles of law; it must be based
on the particular circumstances of each case. ' 77 The court concluded
that the war power excused the Government's action upon "the general
rule that property found in enemy territory is enemy property regardless
of the status of the owner.178
In his concurring opinion, Judge Nichols indicated that the plain-
tiff might have prevailed on his Fifth Amendment argument had he
shown the following elements:
(a) that the acts of the USSR in seizing United States owned plants
in East Germany as "reparations" were contrary to international
law, (b) that the USSR's authorities would sooner or later have ack-
nowledged the fact and paid compensation to the United States own-
ers, and (c) that the United Staes representatives at Potsdam
knowingly surrendered this possibility of compensation in return
for concessions by the USSR in unrelated areas.7 9
Taken as a whole, the Aris Gloves case presents persuasive reason-
ing in support of the theory that the United States has a duty to
compensate claimants whose foreign property interests have been termi-
nated by an intentional refusal to espouse valid claims. Conceding that a
taking can be indirect and still come within the purview of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court of Claims did not directly reject the thrust of the
plaintiff's Fifth Amendment argument. Instead, the Court based its
decision on the peripheral ground of the war power. Finally, Judge
Nichols outlined the three elements of a Fifth Amendment cause of
action: a foreign act of taking in violation of international law; proof
that the foreign country would have compensated the claimant if pressed
to do so, and knowing refusal by the United States to espouse the claim.
74. Id. at 1390.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1391.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1396-97.
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Courts in the future must be more willing, than the Court of Claims
in Aris Gloves, to condemn acts under the foreign relations power when
they encroach on individual property rights. Courts may sustain the
government's refusal to protect a national's property, but they also must
decide if the knowing refusal warrants some form of reimbursement.
The guidelines suggested by Judge Nichols can be helpful in determin-
ing the question. Deference to the foreign affairs power has no place in
judicial considerations of valid Fifth Amendment allegations.
C. Release of a Claim and the Fifth Amendment
The right to release American claims is stated in the Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
§213: The President may waive or settle a claim -against a foreign
state based on the responsibility of the foreign state for an injury
to a United States national, without the consent of such national.8 0
The alleged right to waive claims with neither consent nor indem-
nification was challenged in three important cases. These cases set forth
the major constitutional issues underlying the release of American
claims against foreign states.
The action in Meade v. United States, was based on the United
States' release of all Spanish obligations to pay certain claims of Ameri-
can nationals arising between 1802 and 1819, the date of the treaty
releasing the *claims. In return for the release, the United States received
the Spanish holdings in Florida, plus $5,000,000.00 in claims settle-
ments.
Prior to treaty ratification, a special Spanish tribunal awarded
Meade the sums claimed due. However, upon ratification in 1821, this
claim was released. There was some evidence that Spain believed at the
time of ratification that the United States would assume its adjudicat-
ed debt to Meade.82
Meade's claim was transferred to a domestic claims commission
assigned to adjudicate all American claims to the $5,000,000.00 settle-
ment. The commission refused to receive the Spanish judgment as
evidence of Meade's claim, and because of delays on the part of Ameri-
can officials in obtaining other evidence from Spain, the claim was
denied and the commission disbanded. 3
In 1866, because of great public and congressional debate over
the Meade case, the Court of Claims was given authority to decide the
right of Meade's heirs to the sums denied him.84 In a lengthy opinion,
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN PELkIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES §
213 (1965).
81. 2 Ct. C1. 224 (1866), affd on other grounds, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 691 (1869).
82. Id. at 258-59, 267.
83. Id. at 264.
84. S.J. Res. 78, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
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the court decided that the judgment of the commission, however deplor-
able, had to be viewed as final and conclusive.
In discussing the constitutional issue in relation to its conclu-
sion, the court stated:
The claimant's counsel contend that ... the United States applied
Meade's claim, his private property, to public use, which gives
him a claim to compensation outside and irrespective of the treaty.
That from.., obligations to make just compensation for property
so taken, the law infers... a promise to pay its fair value.
Was the release and cancellation of Meade's claim against
Spain such an appropriation of private property to public use as
comes within the rule of law and the provision of the Constitution?
The court think it was. A man's choses in action, .the debts due
him, are as much property and as sacred in the eye of the law as
are his houses and lands, his horses and his cattle. And when taken
for the public good, or released or cancelled to secure an object
of public importance, are to be paid for in the same maiimer.88
Although the Court of Claims upheld the plaintiff's Fifth Amend-
ment argument, it emphasized that it was bound by the remedy provided
by the government. Hence, the commission's refusal to accept the Span-
ish judgment as evidence, and the resulting decision to deny the claim,
was held to be conclusive.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court
of Claims as it related to the finality of the original judgment, but
displayed little deference to the Fifth Amendment claims. The Court
dismissed the "just compensation" argument on the grounds that Meade
had submitted his claims "to the Department of State for that protection
which his Government might think proper to grant. '8 6 Furthermore, the
Court upheld the right of the United States to release the claim against
Meade's protest, and to determine the method, if any, of compensating
him.
Gray v. United States7 was decided in the Court of Claims nine-
teen years after Meade. The Gray case arose from the release of claims
against France which were based upon "the detention, seizure, condem-
nation, and confiscation ' 88 of American merchant vessels on the high
seas following the French Revolution. The court was granted jurisdic-
tion by Congress in 1885 in an advisory capacity only, leaving Con-
gress to decide the remedy, if any, which would be afforded the claim-
ants' heirs.89
In Gray, the plaintiffs contended that the United States was under
85. 2 Ct. C. at 275.
86. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 691, 693 (1869).
87. 21 Ct. CI. 340 (1886).
88. Id. at 343.
89. French Claims Act of 1885, ch. 25, §§ 1-6, 23 Stat. 283.
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a duty to compensate American citizens for the claims released in the
agreement with France. 0 The Court of Claims sustained the plaintiff's
contention, saying:
It seems to us that this 'bargain'... by which the present peace
and quiet of the United States, as well as their future prosperity and
greatness were largely secured, and which was brought about by the
sacrifice of the interests of individual citizens, falls within the intent
and meaning of the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation.9 1
In reaching its conclusion, the court referred to the opinions of
persons who were contemporaries of the Spoilation agreement. These
views are significant to the extent that they reflect the perspective of
those directly involved in the original drafting and interpretation of the
Constitution. Quoting Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State to Presidents
Washington and Adams, the court wrote that
we bartered "the just claims of our merchants" to obtain a relin-
quishment of the French demand, and that-It would seem that the
merchants have an equitable claim for indemnity from the United
States.92
Furthermore, the Court of Claims referred to Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion "that there was the strongest obligation on the Govern-
ment to compensate the sufferers by the French spoliations. ' '93 The
court also quoted Senator Livingston, a congressional expert on the
French Claims controversy, who argued in his report to the Senate:
The committee think it sufficiently shown that the claim for in-
demnities was surrendered as an equivalent for the discharge of the
United States from its heavy national obligations, and for the dam-
ages that were due for their preceding non-performance of them.
If so, can there be a doubt, independent of the constitutional provis-
ion, that the sufferers are entitled to indemnity? Under that pro-
vision is not this right converted into one that we are under the most
solemn obligations to satisfy? To lessen the public expenditure is a
great legislative duty; to lessen it at the expense of justice, public
faith, and constitutional right would be a crime. Conceiving that
all these require that relief should be granted to the petitioners,
they beg leave to bring in a bill for that purpose.94
The court in Gray thus sustained the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment
argument that the release of valid claims in the national interest gives
rise to a duty to compensate. The Gray opinion stands as an eloquent
statement of Fifth Amendment grounds for compensation when valid
claims are released by the United States.95
90. 21 Ct. Cl. at 343.
91. Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 389.
93. Id. at 390.
94. ld. at 391.
95. It is significant to note that Judge Nichols in Aris Gloves, referring to Gray,
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The Court of Claims also discussed the Fifth Amendment in
relation to the release of claims in Seery v. United States96 decided in
1955. Seery's claim was based upon damage done to her Austrian
property during its occupation by the United States Army, which uti-
lized the estate as on officer's club. By executive agreement, liability for
this claim was transferred to Austria. Seery challenged the right of the
United States to absolve itself of liability.
The decision in Seery's favor was based upon the court's conclusion
that a prior statute accorded Seery the right to sue the United States in
the Court of Claims on claims such as that assigned, and that the
executive agreement could not supersede her statutory right. The case
is not direct authority for the proposition that waiver requires compensa-
tion, but it does imply at least certain limits, if only statutory, on the
executive branch's asserted power to settle claims in its discretion.9 7
The three cases point up the combined interest of the judiciary and
Congress in the troublesome questions raised by the asserted right to
release valid claims without compensation. To date, such waivers are
accepted as a concommitant to executive authority over foreign affairs.
This deference to the foreign relations power must be changed by
congressional or judicial action aimed at granting claimants adequate
protection of their property interests. Gray v. United States sets forth
persuasive reasoning by which a court might require the government to
provide compensation for the release of property claims in the interest of
foreign relations. The case also can be a catalyst for congressional action
to establish statutory guidelines for granting compensation to eligible
individuals whose claims are unilaterally waived. As the opinions in
Gray reiterate, it is difficult logically not to extend the Fifth Amend-
ment to cases where property rights are released by uncontestable deci-
sions within the executive branch. There is a "taking," for public use
(foreign relations), and compensation should be provided.
D. The Fifth Amendment: Settlement Below
Value and Pro Rata Settlement
Related to questions surrounding the failure to espouse a claim and
the asserted right to waive a claim is the question of whether official
stated: 'True, it was an advisory opinion only. Such opinions of course were not
'binding' but I never supposed that lawyers were not to invite attention to them as
precedents." 420 F.2d at 1395 (CL Cl. 1970).
96. 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
97. But cf. Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228 (2d cir. 1951), which held that
the British assignee of a Yugoslav claim against the United States was precluded from
suing this country under the Public Vessels Act on grounds that an executive agreement
with Yugoslavia, by which Yugoslavia released its claims against the United States,
served to withdraw the consent of the United States to be sued.
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settlements less than the property values asserted, and pro rata settle-
ments which relegate claimants to the funds available, are "takings"
within the purview of the Fifth Amendment.
To impose a duty on the government to obtain full compensation
from the offending nation appears impractical, if only because success
ultimately depends on the willingness or ability of the foreign state to
pay. Nonetheless, the government must assume a duty to conscientiously
pursue a maximum settlement, or in the case of lump-sum settlements,
to ascertain the total amount needed for just compensation prior to
negotiating the agreement. The government must operate more as an
agent in this regard, than as a benefactor.
The FCSC now has some authority to preadjudicate mass claims
prior to final settlement, so as to provide negotiators with a more
realistic assessment of the claimants' total need. s Nevertheless, pro rata
settlements, however convenient or fairly assessed, have almost without
exception limited the compensation available to individual claimants. 9
Is this too a (partial) "taking" of property for which compensation is
owing? One author hypothesized:
Let us suppose a case: An American company in 1940 invested a
million dollars in a plant in Country X. Eighty other Americans,
naturalized after their original investment, but before the taking,
used other currencies now greatly depreciated and subject to ex-
change restrictions, in acquiring property in Country X. All private
property in X is nationalized. In order to get dollars now for all
the claimants, a lump-sum settlement of $17,000,000 is accepted as
against a total reported claims of $50,000,000. A fair ratio of
recovery out of this sum for the company is $500,000.
98. E.g., Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. 1643-b (1964); Act of Aug. 15,
1962, Put. L. No. 87-587, 76 Stat. 387 (establishing the Lake Ontario Claims Program).
99. See Avramova v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 420 (1973); Z. & F. Assets
Realization Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470 (1940). In Avramova the plaintiff asserted that
she and others had been deprived of their property without due process of law when
Congress enlarged the class eligible to receive payments from the Bulgarian fund
assigned for distribution to the FCSC. The original plan had included claimants who had
suffered uncompensated confiscations prior to 1955. They received payments from
liquidated Bulgarian assets in the United States. Although their claims were adjudicated
by the commission in the amount of nearly $7,000,000.00, the fund was exhausted at
$2,600,000.00 by 1960. In 1963, an executive agreement with Bulgaria resulted in an
additional $400,000.00 for distribution. Congress in 1968 assigned the distribution to the
FCSC, but enlarged the eligible class to include those whose property had been
confiscated between 1955 and 1963. The court dismissed the contention that plaintiffs'
property rights in the new fund had "vested" when their claims had been originally
adjudicated but not paid in full because of fund exhaustion. In stating that the plaintiffs
failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted, they relied on the power of the
President to settle claims and on the congressional power to provide a remedy. Further-
more, the court invoked the no-review provision of the FCSC act to bar review of the
commission's decisions. Likewise in Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. the Court held that
the assets in the fund would be watered down by admission of more claimants.
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If the United States had done nothing there would clearly
have been no taking on the part of the United States, it seems
certain. If it does act, we should not expect that due process prob-
lems could be avoided by the simple expedient of adverting to the
old dogma that the international reclamation is the sovereign's
cause of action, not the individual's. Despite this theory, the fact
remains that something is being done by executive agreement to
diminish or change the citizen's legal relationship to property.' 00
Courts have avoided the imposition of an obligation on the govern-
ment to provide compensation for pro rata settlements or settlements be-
low value. They have consistently held, that although a property right
might exist, it is a right limited by the remedy that Congress or the Presi-
dent might afford. As the court in Gray v. United States stated: "What-
ever the rights of the claimants, they are without remedy other than that
which Congress may have seen fit to give them."''1 1
In Comegys v. Vasse, the Court reiterated this point:
[I]t may ordinarily be one test of right, that it may be enforced in
*a Court of Justice. Claims and debts due from a sovereign, are not
ordinarily capable of being so enforced. Neither the King of Great
Britain, nor the government of the United States, is suable in the
ordinary Courts of Justice, for debts due by either. Yet, who will
doubt, that such debts are rights? It does not follow, because an
unjust sentence is irreversible, that the party has lost all right tojustice, or all claim, upon principles of public law, to remunera-
tion. With reference to mere municipal law, he may be without
remedy; but with reference to principles of international law, he
has a right. ... 102
In Meade v. United States, the Court of Claims said:
By this treaty, which has all the force and authority of an act of
Congress, the claimant's property is taken for and appropriated to
the public use. Spain is released; all her obligation to the claimant
is cancelled. By the same instrument it is -transferred to, and
assumed by, the United States. But the mode and manner of making
compensation are prescribed by the same instrument. A special
tribunal, with specific powers and special jurisdiction, is created
to adjust and award that compensation. Can the person whose
property has been taken resort to any other means, or sue in any
othertribunal? We think not.103
In the United States v. Weld, the Supreme Court asserted:
The claimants had to rely upon the justice of the government, in
some of its departments, for compensation in satisfaction of their
respective claims .... 104
100. Oliver, Executive Agreements and Emanations from the Fifth Amendment, 49
AM. J. INr'L L. 362, 364 (1955).
101. 21 Ct. Cl. at 343 (emphasis added).
102. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 216 (1828).
103. 2 Ct. Cl. at 276.
104. 127 U.S. 51, 56 (1888).
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Later in Williams v. Heard, the Supreme Court stated:
But the Act of Congress did not create the rights. They had existed
at all times since the losses occurred. They were created by reason
of losses having been suffered. All that the act of Congress did
was to provide a remedy for the enforcement of the right.' 0 5
Thus, on various occasions, courts have held that the remedy for
the violation of an American claimant's rights by a foreign power is
precisely that which executive or legislative decisions determine it to
be-nothing more, nothing less. However, courts have also held that
awards which are made are not mere donations or gratuities to the
claimant. 10 6 As the court in Williams v. Heard said:
[We do not think] that the money appropriated by Congress by the
act of 1882 to pay these claims should be considered merely as a
gratuity.' 07
In Phelps v. McDonald, Justice Swayne stated "[t]here is no element
of a donation in the payment ultimately made in such cases. Nations, no
more than individuals, make gifts of money ... "108
Therefore, once a remedy is accorded, and payments are made, the
claimant receives his award as a matter of right. Prior to that time, the
government may settle the claim at its will, and decide whether to
provide a remedy, on conditions which it may insert.0 9 In 1957, the
United States Court of Appeals, referring to the FCSC, said:
[The FCSC] has the duty of distributing a governmentally created
fund among a class. No claimant... has a right -to participate in
any amount until the Commission has made an award. In short, a
benefit is being conferred. . .
105. 140 U.S. 529,541 (1891).
106. However, the Court in Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439 (1896), held that
payments made in the French Spoilation Claims cases were "by way of gratuity" and
"not of right." Id. at 457. In this situation, Congress appropriated money for the heirs of
claimants whose claims had been released by the 1801 Treaty with France. The
payments, made pursuant to the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 540, § 4, 26 Stat. 862, were
distinguished by the Court from those made in Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193
(1828), and Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529 (1891), on the grounds that the latter
cases involved funds secured from a foreign government in settlement of claims against
it, or funds generated by the United States pursuant to a treaty agreement with the
foreign state. In the Spoilation cases, funds were generated solely by legislative decision.
However, once the claimant qualified under the Act of 1891 and was awarded compensa-
tion, he apparently received it as a matter of statutory right.
107. 140 U.S. at 541.
108. 99 U.S. at 303.
109. In the French Spoilation cases (see note 89 supra) Congress limited awards to
the next of kin and specifically precluded assignees in bankruptcy from claiming the
awards made. See Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439 (1896), for an interpretation of this
condition.
110. American and European Agencies v. Gillilland, 247 F.2d 95, 97-98 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884 (1957).
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Notwithstanding the above "right without a remedy" theory de-
veloped by the courts, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law sug-
gests:
[A] question that has not been definitely settled is whether a settle-
ment by the United States for less than the full value of -the claim
may constitute a taking of property from the injured party that en-
titles him to fall compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.""'
The Fifth Amendment compensation question has not been settled
in part because these interested in the claims field have not accepted the
fact that one's property right can be compromised by the government
without a secure remedy for the loss. The policy which allows settlements
to be compromised with compensation is partly based on the doctrine dis-
cussed earlier, that persons have no independent international status, as
well as on the alleged foreign relations power. Once the courts inter-
pret the individual's right to be continuous and deserving of a remedy
as a matter of right, then the. government's role must change in rela-
tion to the individual claimant. As Jessup writes:
[T]he old Vattelian fiction of the injury to the state through the
injury to its national, should in the ordinary claims case, be
abandoned. It is not inconsistent with such abandonment to agree
that the state retains the right to represent its national, to be...
his agent for collective bargaining."12
Thus far the government reserves its right to compromise claims
with no Fifth Amendment ramifications. The property right remains
unprotected. Both the executive and judicial branches must review the
current policy to insure maximum and secure compensation for property
taken abroad. As Jessup suggests a first step might be to impose on the
government standards of care and fiduciary responsibility akin to those
governing an agent.
E. "National Funds" and the Fifth Amendment
Related to the "right without a remedy" theory is the prevailing
view that funds received by the United States in the settlement of
American claims are "national funds" to which claimants have no legal
rights. By extrapolation, the United States has no duty to distribute these
funds to claimants on whose behalf the funds allegedly were received.
As the Court stated in Williams v. Heard, referring to a lump sum
settlement paid by Britain to the United States:
It was held in United States v. Weld, 127 U.S. 51, that this
award was made to the United States as a nation. The fund was, at
all events, a national fund ,to be distributed by Congress as it saw
111. REsTATnmNr (SEcOND), 'FOREiGN RELATIONS LAw OF TnE UNITED STATES, §
213 (comment) (1965).
112. Jessup, supra note 18, at 923.
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fit.... But no individual claimant had, as a matter of strict legal
or equitable right, any lien upon the fund awarded, nor was Con-
gress under any legal or equitable obligation to pay any claim out
of... that fund.113
This rule applies with equal force to individual claims determined
by international commissions. For example, in La Abra Silver Mining
Company v. United States,114 an award was made to the plaintiff by the
United States-Mexico Commission. Both the United States and Mexico
had "agreed to consider the result of the proceedings of the Commission
as a full, perfect and final settlement of every claim. . ."ll5 But the
United States withheld payment of the award because a fraud allegedly
,had been perpetrated by the company on the commission. In this action
to compel payment, the Supreme Court stated:
As between the United States and Mexico, indeed as between
the United States and American claimants, the money received from
Mexico under the award of the Commission was in strict law the
property of the United States, and no claimant could assert or en-
force any interest in it so long as the Government legally with-
held it from distribution." 61
Similarly, in Bayard v. White,'" the Court denied a writ of manda-
mus compelling payment of an award made under the joint convention
between the United States and Mexico. The ground for the refusal to
pay was a contest to the award proceeds which had arisen subsequent to
the commission grant. The court held that this was an adequate ground
for a refusal on the part of the secretary of state to pay the money in
question."18
In Great Western Insurance Company v. United States,"19 the
Court dismissed the plaintiff's important contention that the United
States became a trustee for the claimant when it received money from
Great Britain pursuant to the Alabama Claims settlement.2 0 However,
as Professor Lillich points out, "Although the trust fund doctrine is
more theory than reality, references are occasionally made to it in cases,
in statute, and in Congress."'' Supporting Lillich's observation, former
President Nixon, in reference to the recent settlement with Peru, stated
113. 140 U.S. 529, 537-38 (1891). The Court in Weld stated: "It is not necessary to
discuss whether, in the absence of any action by Congress as to the distribution of this
fund, there could have been any legal or equitable right in any person or corporation to
any portion of it." 127 U.S. 51, 56. This seems to have been settled by Heard.
114. 175 U.S. 423 (1899).
115. Id. at 426.
116. Id. at 458.
117. 127 U.S. 246 (1887).
118. Id. at249.
119. 112 U.S. 193 (1884).
120. Id. at 195.
121. LILICH, supra note 46, at 36-37.
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that "[t]he Government of the United States will deposit the [money]
in a trust account in the U.S. Treasury."' 12 2 Despite such occasional
references, the trust fund theory is not in accord with current case law.
The "national fund" theory may operate to deny a claimant both
just compensation and basic due process. If settlement proceeds are
withheld, the claimant has no basis for compelling payment, even if the
claim is held to be valid. As the plaintiff in Great Western Insurance
asserted, the role of the United States, as the receiver of settlement
funds, must be revised to that of a trustee having an enforceable duty
to transfer settlement proceeds to the eligible claimants. In practice,
the trustee would execute a duty to transfer funds to the FCSC for
equitable distribution. The remedy for withholding proceeds would
be a mandamus action initiated by the claimant(s) to compel payment.
The trustee role, like the agent role, equitably modifies government
power in favor of the individual. This is more consistent with the trend
in constitutional law affording maximum protection to individual rights
and liberties.
F. Equal Protection and the Nationality
Requirement
Recent Supreme Court cases raise the issue of whether resident
aliens, who held that status at the time of the alleged foreign taking,
should summarily be denied the current "privilege" of diplomatic pro-
tection on grounds of their noncitizenship. In Sugarman v. Dougall,2 1
the appellees were four federally registered resident aliens, who were
prohibited by statute from employment with the New York civil service
because of their alien status. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the
Court pointed to the statute's "indiscriminate" exclusion of aliens from
competing for civil service positions.12 4 The Court stressed that "an alien
is entitled to the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause,"' 25 and, citing
Graham v. Richardson, 28 the Court reasserted its long term position
that "classifications based on alienage are 'subject to close judicial scruti-
ny.' ,,12 The standard for such scrutiny is "the substantiality of the
State's interest in enforcing" the restrictive law.' 21
Here, the asserted state interests were (1) the interest in limiting
government participation to those within the "political community," and
122. DEPT. STATE BULL. 272, 273 (Mar. 18, 1974).
123. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
124. Id. at 639.
125. Id. at 641.
126. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
127. 413 U.S. at 642.
128. Id.
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(2) the state's "special public interest" in restricting its resources for
citizen benefit.129
On the first point, the Court held that the statute was "neither
narrowly confined nor precise in its application,"' 130 and therefore was
improperly drawn to meet the asserted interests. On the second conten-
tion, the Court stressed that the public interest doctrine was rooted in
the notion that privileges, not rights, could be limited to citizens, and
that constitutional rights such as equal protection do not "turn upon
whether a government benefit is characterized as a 'right' or a 'privi-
lege.' "131
In the companion case to Sugarman, In Re Griffiths§32 the Court
applied the suspect classification doctrine and required the state of
Connecticut to demonstrate a substantial state interest in prohibiting
admission of aliens to the state bar. The Court concluded that the state's
interest in assuring requisite qualifications for those licensed to practice
law was adequately protected by the existing safeguards applicable to all
lawyers.
Although these two cases deal specifically with state laws relating
to employment, the rationale of the cases can be applied to the arbitrary
exclusion of aliens from State Department protection. The State Depart-
ment characterization of its protection as a privilege and not a legal
right cannot, on the language of Sugarman, provide an adequate basis
for arbitrary exclusion of aliens, because of the broader constitutional
right to equal protection. In addition, that State Department rules are
informal, and not "law," seems inadequate to sustain the department's
restrictive policy.
To meet the Sugarman and Griffiths test, the department logically
must bear a burden of proving that it has a substantial and "constitu-
tionally permissible" interest in excluding aliens from protection,13 3 and
that the policy is narrowly confined "to the accomplishment of its
purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."134
The constitutional ground for the State Department restriction
relating to aliens is the amorphous foreign relations power that is now
delegated to the executive branch. Under this power, if the espousal of
an alien's claim would injure foreign relations, for example, by involving
a claim against the homeland of the alien, then refusal to espouse the
claim would seem an appropriate decision in light of possible interna-
tional conflicts.
129. Id. at 642-43.
130. Id. at 643.
131. Id. at 644.
132. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
133. Id. at 721-22.
134. Id.
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However, the policy of exclusion is "indiscriminate."' 35 According
to Assistant Legal Advisor Fabian Kwiatek, eligible claimants must
have been "bona fide citizens, by birth or by naturalization" at the time
of the taking.13 6 Therefore, although there may be occasions where
espousal would violate a substantial departmental interest under the
foreign relations power, the department policy is neither "narrowly
confined nor precise in its application"'13 7 toward that interest.
At present, aliens are denied equal protection guarantee implicit in
the Fifth Amendment in the area of redress through the government on
claims against foreign countries. That policy must be reviewed in light
of the case law trend affording resident aliens broader equal protection
guarantees.
G. State Department Procedures and Due Process
The State Department procedure is "ad hoc.' 38 Review of State
Department actions is generally precluded under the political question
doctrine and the wide discretion given the executive branch in foreign
affairs. 13 There is more room and more need for mechanisms to as-
sure procedural and substantive due process for the private interests
affected than those acknowledged in the traditional view of State De-
partment prerogative. 140
Critics have suggested that greater application of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act to State Department activities might operate to better
135. See 413 U.S. at 639.
136. Interview (telephone) with Fabian A. Kwiatek, Feb. 27, 1975.
137. 413 U.S. at 643.
138. "Since the decision whether or not to present a formal claims ... is said to be
entirely within the discretion of the Department of State, claimants as a matter of right
do not have access to an administrative hearing where their request for diplomatic
interposition might be weighed. However, in practice any claimant or his attorney may
make appointments to meet with officers of the Legal Adviser's Office of the Department
in order to present a claim. As no procedural rights are formalized, the validity of a
claim must be demonstrated by convincing evidence presented to the Department during
such meetings or by mail." LmLICH & CHUSTENSON, supra note 22, at 89.
139. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, (1936), which
is repeatedly cited by State Department officials. See RovINE, supra note 5, at 174 and
333 for examples of department reliance on Curtiss-Wright. For suggestions as to
encroachments on this wide discretion, see notes 13, 14, 15 and accompanying text.
140. Leigh & Atkeson, Due Process in the Emerging Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, 22 Bus. LAw 3, 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Leigh & Atkeson]. Lillich
and Christenson write: "It is possible that a more formal administrative procedure for
presenting claims for espousal would increase the effectiveness of the process by
safeguarding against excessive use of subjective standards by the Department in its
determination of the validity of a claim for espousal purposes." However, the authors
conclude that "the built-in separation of the Legal Adviser's Office from the political and
other bureaus of the Department" provides "insurance against arbitrariness." LiLLICH &
CHRMENSON, supra note 22, at 89-90.
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insure private interests. 41 Observers note that judicial intervention in
the passport cases is one indicator that the judiciary may intervene when
State Department functions serve to encroach on fundamental constitu-
tional guarantees.' 42 It has also been suggested that the Court of
Claims should be granted jurisdiction to hear claims against the United
States arising from treaties.' 43 That jurisdiction is now precluded.
These recommendations and observations warrant congressional
attention. Private relations betWeen the government and the individual,
especially when they affect constitutionally protected property rights,
deserve more protection than is now accorded by an arbitrary exercise of
governmental power in derogation of basic due process guarantees. One
official stated the situation succinctly:
The protection of individual rights may appear to be microcos-
mic in relation to the macrocosmic international operations in which
the Executive Branch is involved. Nevertheless, it is the obligation
of the government to afford private individuals as much procedural
protection as the nature of the situation admits. Far too frequently
the major obstacle in the way of supplying this protection is not
the indifference or the obtuseness of the government officials in-
volved but the lack of appropriate administrative procedures.' 44
Notwithstanding the foreign relations power, the State Department
should not be exempt from effective supervisory control, especially
where private rights are affected. Procedures must be changed to ensure
that private rights are not compromised by arbitrary action.
H. FCSC and No-Review
The FCSC has been involved in several suits brought by dissatis-
fied claimants challenging its decisions or methods. The court in each of
these cases has invoked the no-review provision of the enabling statute
to avoid a decision on the merits.
Because property rights are at issue, more extensive review should
be accorded by Congress or the courts, especially when constitutional
allegations are pressed. Although the courts have shown some deference
to the view that constitutional issues may be passed upon, notwithstand-
ing the no review provision, no court to date has disregarded the provi-
sion as a bar to complete review on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.
a. De Vegvar v. Gillilland
In de Vegvar v. Gillilland,'45 decided in 1955, the plaintiff sued
141. Leigh & Atkeson, supra note 140, at 10-11.
142. Id. at 13-15.
143. Id. at 27-28.
144. Id. at 27, quoting from Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the
Protection of the Individual in International Economic Regulation, 17 ADM N. L REV.
159, 166 (1965).
145. 228 F.2d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 994 (1956).
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the FCSC to compel reconsideration of her claim to a portion of the
Yugoslav Claims Fund. The commission held that she was not a nation-
al at the time her property was taken by Yugoslavia. In reaching its
decision, the commission excluded evidence showing that Yugoslavia
had not obtained title to the property by local law until 1947, by which
time the plaintiff was a naturalized citizen. One commissioner dissented
on the grounds that, based on those facts, the plaintiff had met the
nationality requirement.
De Vegvar relied on Section 4(a) of the International Claims
Settlement Act, which directed the commission to apply both the provi-
sion of the claims agreement and "the applicable principles of interna-
tional law, justice, and equity." 14 6 She felt that the commission's refusal
to analyze the Yugoslavian confiscation statute in relation to her proper-
ty was both a failure to exercise its jurisdiction and an arbitrary act
disconsonant with "the principles of international law."'1 47
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that:
Errors in the result reached, or errors in the admission of evidence
or in the making of a legal ruling-assuming such errors to have
been made-are not grounds for judicial intervention in the face of
the congressional fiat that the Commission's determinations shall
be free of judicial review.' 48
However, the court significantly conceded:
We may assume for purposes of argument -that the provisions of
Section 4(h) [barring review] would probably not prevent judicial
relief in the situation-to illustrate-where a claimant is denied
consideration by reason of his race, creed or color. No violation of
constitutional right is suggested here: plaintiff-appellant makes
no contention, for example, that the United States has taken her
property without paying for it.
In addition, the court expressly refused to pass on the government's
contention that "settlements of international claims-absent clear con-
gressional intent to the contrary-give rise to no right of judicial re-
"'149view....
b. American and European Agencies
Two years after De Vegvar, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
was presented with American and European Agencies v. Gillilland,50 in
146. 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1970).
147. 228 F.2d at 642.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 247 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 884 (1957).
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which the plaintiff again sought to compel reconsideration of a FCSC
decision.
In this case the plaintiff asserted that she had not been accorded an
adequate hearing before the commission, because she "was not fur-
nished a staff memorandum on which the Commission relied in making
its determination of value,"'' and because "the constitutional right to a
hearing includes the right to know and meet the claims of the opposing
party . ... "I2 She contended that the no-review provision applied only
to "action taken pursuant to prescribed procedures and then only to ques-
tions relating to the merits of a claim."'15 3 She also contended that
"Congress may not prevent a court from requiring agency compliance
with statutory procedures. 115 4
The court rejected the first contention on the ground that the no-
review provision was absolute:
When Congress tells the courts -that there shall not be review, we
will not assume, in the absence of something more, that Congress
could not have meant what it said. 155
On the second contention, the court stated:
If the agency's failure to follow prescribed procedures resulted
in the denial of a constitutional right, the validity of a blanket non-
reviewability clause would indeed pose a grave and difficult con-
stitutional question.' 56
However, the court, assuming arguendo that it had jurisdiction, con-
cluded that due process in a hearing before the FCSC required no more
than an opportunity to be heard. 1'
The court also concluded:
On the showing here we are not required to decide whether Sec-
tion 4(h) should be narrowly construed to permit review of the
validity of a deprivation of a constitutional right.15 8
In an active dissent, Judge Miller interpreted the majority opinion
as holding that "the agency here involved may disobey a clear congres-
sional directive to grant a hearing, without being called to the courts;
that it cannot be judicially required to act within the framework of its
statutory authority." "This," he concluded, "seems to me to be dangerous
doctrine ... "I"
151. Id. at 97.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 96.
154. Id. at 97.
155. Id.
156. Id.





Judge Miller went on to analyze the statute and concluded that the
phrase which bars review of an "action of the Commission in allowing
or denying any claim" refers to the merits of the claim and not to
questions of adequate procedure. 160 He also interpreted the word "ac-
tion" above to mean action "taken pursuant to prescribed procedures,"
because:
[Ilt would be perfectly idle for Congress to prescribe a procedure
such as the holding of a hearing and then immediately to nullify
the requirement by providing that the agency may disregard it
with impunity.' 61
The error of the majority, in Judge Miller's opinion, was in viewing
plaintiff's claim as one seeking review on the merits, where, in fact, she
sought only to compel the commission "to hold the hearing which the
statute requires.' 62
c. Haas v. Humphrey
In Haas v. Humphrey, 63 decided the same year as American and
European Agencies, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals dis-
missed plaintiff's claim that her foreign citizenship at the time of confis-
cation should not bar her from qualifying to receive compensation from
the Yugoslav Claims Fund. She based this claim on two allegations: (1)
"that the United States Government undertook to release her claim
against the Government of Yugoslavia," which requires compensation
under the Fifth Amendment,' and (2) that State Department officials,
prior to signing the treaty with Yugoslavia, had stated that she would be
included among those beneficial owners within the treaty provisions.
Therefore, she alleged her claim had in fact been released, barring her
from any further recourse against Yugoslavia. The FCSC denied both
allegations. Despite the dicta in de Vegvar and American and European
Agencies implying the court would hear constitutional issues, the court
once more invoked the no-review provision to avoid a decision on the
merits. As to the plaintiff's allegation, the court evasively held:
Appellant urges, contrary to the Commission's conclusion, that
her claim against Yugoslavia was in fact released by the United
States. But that is something we need not undertake to decide, as
our disposition of the case would not in any event turn on the
point. The Government [alleges] that inasmuch as Mrs. Haas was
not entitled to the treaty's benefits her claim against Yugoslavia
was not released and remains alive. If that is so, there has been no
160. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 246 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Haas v. Anderson, 355 U.S.
854 (1957).
164. Id. at 683.
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taking whatever of Mrs. Haas' property. If 'that is not so, it does
not follow that the taking-if any there was---can or should be
compensable from the Yugoslav Claims Fund, unless and until
there has been an award by the Commission. In any event, it does
not follow that this court is empowered to set aside the Commis-
sion's adverse determination. 6 5
The court also concluded that the commission seemed to have
observed procedural due process. 166
d. Zutich v. Gilliland
In Zutich v. Gillilland,"'67 decided one year after American and
European Agencies and Haas, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
invoked the no-review provision to deny the appellant a hearing on the
question of whether he became a national within the time period estab-
lished for claimant elgibility in the Yugoslav Claims Fund. By so
doing, the court held that the no review provision supersedes a provision
in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.168 Under the latter
provision, courts have jurisdiction over cases where a person who claims
a right or privilege as an American national is denied such right by a
department or official of the United States, on the ground that he is not
a national of the United States. It is significant that the court invoked
the no-review provision when it had persuasive grounds under the
Immigration Act to decide the case on the merits.
e. First National City Bank
The same year as Zutich, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals again refused to decide the appellant's claim on the ground of
the no-review provision. In First National City Bank v. Gillilland 69 the
issue arose from a FCSC decision denying that appellant came within a
statutory provision which allowed American claimants "in whose favor"
court attachments had issued against Soviet property in the United States
prior to the Litvinov assignments, to be compensated from a Soviet
Claims Fund appropriated in 1955. The appellant bank, to meet federal
jurisdictional requirements, had assigned its claim to a British citizen
who collected upon the attachment of Soviet property prior to the
Litvinov Assignment. After deducting attorney's fees and expenses, the
assignee passed the balance to appellant.
Appellant contended that on the above facts, the writ of attach-
ment had issued "in its favor" because of an oral trust with the assignee
165. Id. at 683-84.
166. Id.
167. 254 F.2d 464 (6th Cir 1958).
168. 8 U.S.C. 1503(a) (1970).
169. 257 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 837 (1958).
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and its position as beneficial owner of the claim originally pressed by the
assignee. The FCSC denied this contention.
The court acknowledged that the FCSC decision "may have been
an error of law, an unjustified elevation of form over substance."'170
However, the court declined to review the decision on grounds of the
finality provision.
Appellant also stressed that because the statute expressly included
beneficiaries of naked trusts, the commission unconstitutionally rede-
fined its jurisdiction by denying appellant's claim. Appellant cited sever-
al Surpeme Court cases to that effect. The court responded inadequate-
ly:
In none of those cases was there an express statutory provision
that the actions of the administrative body should be unreviewable.
There is no constitutional problem with regard to this point in the
appellant's argument. Congress could have expressly disqualified
beneficiaries of oral trusts from the benefits of the statute, hence,
if its delegate with unreviewable power denies those benefits to
such persons, it has not violated the Constitution. 71
Finally, appellant asserted that his exclusion from the fund was a
Fifth Amendment taking for which compensation was owing. The court
referred to earlier litigation between the United States and claimants like
the appellant, and concluded appellant's failure to intervene in that suit
terminated his right to raise the Fifth Amendment argument.
In each of these cases, the no-review provision was invoked to bar a
court decision on the merits. Legitimate rights were compromised by the
courts' continual deference to what they view to be a congressional
mandate. Courts should show less deference to this alleged "mandate"
when procedural or substantive due process is at issue, or when other
constitutional allegations are pressed. In addition, Congress might re-
word the finality provision to better define its scope, in order that justice
is insured according to each individual case.
Conclusion
The claims area involves two competing constitutional directives:
the Fifth Amendment and the foreign relations power as it has been
interpreted by the courts. Should the United States bear the burden of
inadequate compensation, when its efforts fail to produce a satisfactory
result?
As the court in Aris Gloves states, the central problem is where to
draw the line.17 2 It has been contended here that there should be an
170. Id. at 226.
171. Id.
172. 420 F.2d 1386 (CL Cl. 1970).
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affirmative duty to espouse valid claims in a capacity analogous to that
of an agent when no other recourse is possible and local remedies have
been exhausted. It has also been contended that waiver without consent,
because it, too, bars further recourse, should be seen as the breach of an
affirmative duty to protect the interests of claimants. This note has
sought to encourage the use of presettlement investigation to determine
the size of the fund needed and the application of the "trust fund"
theory to protect the corpus for the benefit of claimants. Permanent
resident aliens who held that status at the time of the alleged taking
should be accorded protection for their interests. Finally, greater proce-
dural and substantive due process has been urged in relation to State
Department procedures and review of FCSC decisions.
What are the practical implications of these positions?
When espousal is refused on foreign policy grounds, and the
claimant can prove that espousal would have resulted in a compensation
award, as well as the value of the property interest lost, then compensa-
tion in a reasonably estimateable amount should be paid. The burden on
the claimant in this respect would be great. The best forum for such
dispute settlement would seem to be the Court of Claims, because of its
expertise in the claims area.
Likewise, when the United States knowingly waives or releases a
claim, a duty to compensate should arise if the requisite degree of proof
is established: (1) wrongful taking by the alien government, (2) prop-
erty value, and (3) the likelihood of payment on the claim waived.
When lump sum or below-value settlements are received, the burden
falls on the United States to prove reasonable effort in representing the
interests of each claimant affected, and usually limited, by these awards.
Granting protection to permanent resident aliens would seem to be
more consistent with recent decisions affording them constitutional pro-
tections than is current State Department practice.
Easiest to effect would be changes in procedures within the State
Department, pursuant to the suggestions already discussed. More active
review of FCSC decisions, through court or congressional action, is also
necessary to insure maximum justice for individual claimants.
Perhaps the most satisfactory solution, and that most often
urged,173 is to allow claimants to by-pass the espousal morass and have
direct access to international tribunals dealing solely in claims settle-
ments. In this way, individuals would assume their rightful and emerg-
ing status as full subjects of international law, and states would be free
from the complexities of claims espousal, and the necessity of subjecting
173. See, e.g., GoRMLEY, supra note 19; ROVINE, supra note 25, at 463-65, its
discussion of Senate proposals to expand the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice to include private individuals.
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these rights to the dictates of foreign policy. To this end, the work being
done in codifying international law with respect to state responsibility to
aliens174 is a great step toward providing a legal framework for such
international tribunals. If states can be brought to see the advantages of
accepting the jurisdiction of such courts, what is now ivory-towerism can
become reality. Ultimately, individuals may be able to claim protection
as a matter of international right to receive just compensation for a
"taking" on public policy grounds.
174. See, e.g., GAIcCA-AmADoR, SOHN & BAYXTr, supra note 19, which is a compila-
tion of major recent codifications.

